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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
RECENT CASES
ALIENS - EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION - CONSTITUTIONALITY - A habeas cor-
pus proceeding was brought by an alien against whom a deportation order
had been issued. The finality and propriety of the order was not questioned,
but relief was requested under a statute authorizing the United States At-
torney General to withhold deportation in any case where, in his opinion, the
alien would be subject to physical persecution in his native country.' The
United States District Court denied relief from the deportation order holding
that the statute does not require an adjudication to be determined on record
after opportunity for agency hearing. The matter is committed to agency
discretion and an alien is not entitled to a hearing and determination of his
application for a stay.2 The United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment and- remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss
the petition upon the ground that the cause was moot. Chiu But Hao v. Barber,
350 U.S. 878 (1955).
It appears to be well settled that an alien is entitled to judicial review of
a deportation order under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
3
Here, however, the appellant questions neither the order nor the procedure
pieceding it, but instead prays for the favorable exercise of an executive's
discretionary power through judicial intervention. It is equally well settled
that he is not so entitled. 4 Despite the severity of the penalty the courts have
unanimously held that deportation matters are entirely civil in nature. 5 Due
process protection may hence be of a more restricted nature than that which
applies to criminal proceedings," and strict adherence to judicial procedure is
not required in a hearing in deportation proceedings.7
The power to expel an alien is essentially within the plenary power of the
political branches of the government., Here, Congress has placed the power
to suspend deportation in the hands of the Attorney General to exercise at his
discretion. He is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of the
facts, and no other tribunal can re-examine or controvert the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which he acted.9 Congress did not make suspension of de-
portation a legal right. It is manifest that the Attorney General's procedural
regulations could not establish a tight that Congress was unwilling to be-
stow.,"
The Congressional intent seems clear. A prior statute requiring the with-
holding of deportation if the Attorney General should find that the alien
1. 66 Stat. 212 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1253 (1952).
2. Chiu But Han v. Barber, 222 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1955).
3. Kristensen v. McGrath, 340 U.S. 162 (1950); Prince v. Mackay, 185 F.2d 578
(6th Cir. 1950); Podovinnidoff v. Miller, 179 F.2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1950).
4. U. S. ex rel Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied 333
U. S. 876 (1948); U. S. ex rel Zabaduia v. Garfinkel, 77 F.Supp 751 (W.D. Pa. 1948)
(When a statute has conferred discretionary power on an executive department ;he court
cannot interfere with this'exercise of discretion).
5. E.g. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 (1952).
6. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912).
7. U. S. v. Zimmerman, 94 F.Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
8. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekui v. U. S., 142
U. S. 651 (1892) (This power is founded upon the international sovereign right .0 regulate
foreign affairs).
9. Nishimura Ekui v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651 (1892).
10. 62 Yale L. J. 846.
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would be subjected to physical persecution"1 was modified by the present
statute so as to authorize the action if the Attorney General's opinion was
that the facts existed. This would indicate that the withholding of deporta-
tion under such circumstances rests wholly within the administrative judgment
and opinion of the Attorney General or his delegate. 12 The courts may inter-
vene when an alien has been denied appropriate procedural due process or a
fair consideration of his application,' :' but, if these requirements have been
met, they are powerless to modify the Attorney General's final decision.'
It has never been contended that the judiciary may pardon or mandamus tile
executive to pardon. It seems equally certain that the Attorney General's
power of clemency in this instance is one which has been placed beyond tile
reach of the courts.1 5
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY FOR
INVOKING PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF - INCRIMINATION - The Circuit Court
ordered disbarment of an attorney for invoking the privilege against self-in-
crimination before a Senate sub-committee, when questioned in connection
with alleged membership in the Communist Party. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida it was held, one justice dissenting, that the order be re-
versed. The mere invocation of the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination, is not sufficient to justify disbarment. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d
657 (Fla. 1955).
A state can dismiss certain types of employees for exercising the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination.' For example, the exercise of the
privilege by a police officer is deemed incompatible with his prescribed
11. 64 Stat 1010 (1950), 8 U. S. C. §156 (1950).
12. U. S. ex rel Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954); U. S.
ex rel Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953) (The courts :nay not tubstitute
their judgment for his). See also a communication to the Yale Law Journal 'rom Senator
Pat McCarran (D. Neb.), 17 January 19.53: "The change in the language of the provision
as it now appears in the Immigration and Nationality Act was motivated by a desire to
clarify the provision to make it perfectly clear that a determination of whether or :lot he
deportation of an alien should be withheld in such cases is solely within 1he discretion
of the Attorney General."
13. U. S. ex tel Accardi v. Shaughoessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954); U. S. ex rel Teong
Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954); U. S. ex rel Dotenz v. Shaugh-
nessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. Barreiro v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1954) (Attorney General need :tot
have suspended deportation even if alien had court judgment declaring eligibility); Sled-
dens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1949).
15. U. S. ex tel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
1. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no person 3hall be
compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself. Similar provisions are ound
in all the state constitutions with the exception of Iowa and New Jersey, where the )rivi-
lege against self-incrimination exists as part of the common law. State v. Height, 177 lowa
650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527, 60 Atl. 202 (1905); See 8
Wigmore, Evidence, §2252, p. 320, n. 1 & 2 (3rd ed. 1940). If the Fifth Amendment
was literally interpreted the privilege could be inovked only in criminal actions. However,
the courts have liberally construed both the federal and the state provisions, giving the
clauses the same effect as the privilege had at common law. It can therefore be "nvoked
in both civil and criminal proceedings. Christal v. Police Comm'n. of San Francisco, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 264, 92 P.2d 416 (1936); In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 59 P.2d 313
(1936). A witness may not be contumacious in his refusal . To justify silence "t :nust
appear that the answer which might be given would have a direct tendency to "ncriminate.
United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Flegenheimer,
82 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1936). However, a witness is not required to show that the zesti-
